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From its beginning the history of quantum mechanics has been beset by
questions concerning the nature of the objects with which the theory deals.
Controversy started soon after Planck (1901) had introduced discrete energy
packets hν in his theoretical derivation of the law of black body radiation
(which determines the distribution of energy over the frequencies of electro-
magnetic radiation, in thermal equilibrium).
Planck had set out to calculate the average energy of the electromagnetic
oscillators in the wall of a box containing radiation, because these oscillators
emit and absorb radiation and establish thermal equilibrium with the field.
To determine this average energy Planck needed the entropy of the system
of oscillators, for which he used the celebrated Boltzmann expression S =
k logW , with S the entropy and W the number of possible configurations of
the system. In the case at hand this number of configurations is the number
of ways a given amount of energy can be distributed over N oscillators—a
number that is difficult to get a grip on, since energy is a continuous quantity.
Planck’s introduction of discrete energy packets was first of all meant to
reduce this distribution problem to the more tractable one of distributing P
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energy packets over N oscillators. The latter is a combinatorics problem, in
which Planck treated the oscillators as distinct physical individuals, so that
permuting them lead to different configurations. By contrast, Planck treated
the energy elements hν as mathematical quantities without physical identity:
he assumed that the interchange of two or more energy elements hν in the
formulas did not correspond to any physical change.
The physical motivation for this different treatment of oscillators and
energy packets is clear. The oscillators are entities that differ in one or more of
their physical properties: at least their positions in the walls of the container
are different. So if, for example, an energy distribution is considered in which
oscillator 1 has energy Eα and oscillator 2 energy Eβ , and the two oscillators
are interchanged, we obtain a distribution with oscillator 1 possessing energy
Eβ, which represents a different situation.
But when we start contemplating what we have to do in order to replace
a part of the energy of oscillator 1 with the same amount of energy now
residing in oscillator 2, we run into conceptual difficulties. Classically, energy
is a continuous quantity, and there is no clear and natural way of subdividing
the total energy of each oscillator into parts; let alone parts possessing their
own identity, so that it would become meaningful to say that there is a
difference between the situation in which the total energy of oscillator 1 is
Eα while all this energy is where it was before, and the situation where this
total energy is still Eα, but now part of it was originally in oscillator 2.
But, of course, the supposition that the amount of energy can be varied
continuously is typical of classical mechanics. In classical mechanics it does
not make sense to think, e.g., of the speed of a material body as consisting
of an individual first and a second half, and likewise it is meaningless to ask
about individual parts of the energy. However, in Planck’s calculation the
energy is quantized: Planck assumed that the oscillators can only possess
energy values n.hν, with n an integer. So the question arises if this doesn’t
make an essential difference for the problem of whether it makes sense to
switch energy elements.
The answer is that the quantization of energy does not automatically
imply that there exist individual energy units. Think of the analogy of a
collection of jugs, each filled with a quantity of liquid that is an integer
multiple of deciliters, because the filling mechanism can deliver only these
discrete volumes. In spite of the fact that the amount of liquid in each jug is
“quantized”, there is no first, second, third, etc., deciliter in any given jug,
once it has been filled.
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This analogy might be considered imperfect: one might argue that in
a microscopic description there do exist individual constituents of the fluid
(molecules or atoms) and that in principle it would be possible to follow them
during the filling process. In this way one could define the first deciliter that
came in, and so on, by distinguishing between molecules that entered first
and those that came in later. Note, however, that this counterargument does
not show that the quantized nature of the volumes entails that these volumes
are composed of individual units: on the contrary, the argument adopts as
its premise that there exist individual fluid constituents, quite independently
of the volume quantization, and its conclusion is consequently independent
of whether or not fluid amounts are discrete. Nevertheless an alternative
analogy, first introduced by Schrödinger (1950), avoids objections of this
kind and captures the situation in quantum mechanics better.
Schrödinger discusses the case of money in a bank account—scriptural
(deposit) money, not physical coins and banknotes in a safe. Suppose the
balance is 100 euros; does it make sense to ask for the first euro in the
account? Clearly not: there are no individual euros in the account. Assume
that I take a 1 euro coin to a bank branch and deposit it in the account. The
account balance will change to 101 euros, but it does not make sense to pose
the question which of these 101 euros corresponds to my coin: there is no
hundred-and-first euro. This is different from the case of the fluid particles
of the earlier analogy, where we could—in principle—follow particles over
time. (In fact, the coin will still physically exist somewhere; it has not been
absorbed by the bank account—this is a remaining disanalogy with quantum
cases in which amounts of energy are absorbed into a bigger whole.) The
balance of the bank account represents a total amount of buying power that
does not consist of individually existing units.
Does this mean that the account is filled with a collection of entities
of a previously unknown kind, namely entities that lack individuality and
identity? Entities that are completely indistinguishable from each other, and
to which the notion of identity does not apply, so that each of them cannot
even be said to be identical to itself? In order to discuss such putative
objects in a consistent way we should employ a logic reflecting the rules of
a non-standard set theory, since in standard (ZF) set theory each member
of a set automatically has its own identity (namely the property represented
by the singleton set of which it is the sole member). Going this way seems
an extraordinary and highly artificial measure. After all, there is nothing
mysterious or unsatisfactory in the usual descriptions of situations of the
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bank account type: for this, both bankers and clients only need standard
logic and standard set theory. Common-sense dictates that there are no
constituent parts of the total buying power of a bank account. It is usually
true that it is possible to withdraw only discrete sums of money from bank
accounts, for example integer numbers of euro cents. But as we already have
seen this does not imply that there were individual cents in my account.
It is true that under certain conditions amounts of money may acquire
an identity. Different withdrawn amounts can be told apart if they land
in different bank accounts, and similarly flows of money can sometimes be
followed over time. In a scenario in which a collection of bank accounts can
each contain only 1 or 0 euro, euros can be identified individually by the
account they are in (see (Dieks and Versteegh 2008), also for comparison
with the quantum case). This is not because we are here facing objects that
are generally without identity but now suddenly obtain an identity. There
are no euros independent of accounts in these cases—there are only accounts,
identifiable by their account numbers, and possessing definite values.
In the following we will discuss and defend a way of dealing with “identical
quantum particles” that is very similar to the story we just sketched for bank
money. That is, we will consider a collection of “identical particles that are in
exactly the same state” as one object, not consisting of individual parts; this
quantum object is identified by the state and its occupation number. Under
certain circumstances it will happen, though, that distinguishing character-
istics are created (analogously to what may happen in bank transfers) and
that the notion of an individual quantum particle becomes applicable.
By going this way we will deviate from what in the philosophy of physics
has become known as the “Received View” regarding the nature of identical
quantum particles (French and Krause 2006). This Received View is moti-
vated by developments that took place after Planck’s introduction of discrete
oscillator energies, starting with Einstein’s suggestion that black body radia-
tion might be considered to consist of “light quanta” with energy hν, even in
the absence of any energy exchanges with material oscillators (Einstein 1905).
This suggestion remained controversial, but started to gain acceptance when
two decades later Einstein (1924) showed that Planck’s statistical treatment
of energy packets could also be applied successfully to the atoms of a quan-
tum gas. The basic statistical feature that permutations of the elements
“filling a state” leave the state invariant remained in place in this new ap-
plication of Planck’s statistics—but now these elements were interpreted as
particles, instead of the earlier energy packets. This permutation invariance
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of particles led to the core idea of the Received View: quantum particles
of the same kind are physical objects of a previously unknown sort, namely
objects without identity.
2 The Received View
2.1 Quantum statistics
As mentioned, Planck’s derivation of the black body radiation law hinged on
the calculation of the entropy of the oscillators that exchange energy with
the radiation inside a container. Planck assumed that this energy exchange
could only take place in discrete amounts, namely multiples of hν, with ν the
radiation’s frequency. Since the entropy is proportional to the logarithm of
the number of possible states, it has to be determined how many ways there
are for N oscillators to jointly possess a total (quantized) energy Pε, with ε
the “energy element” hν. Put differently, the question is in how many ways
the total energy Pε can be distributed over N recipients that each can hold
only an integer number of energy elements. Planck (1901) had been very
brief about this question: he had simply written down the answer
CNP =
(N − 1 + P )!
(N − 1)!P !
, (1)
referring to a text on combinatorics in which a rather complicated line of
reasoning for a similar situation was presented. This did not satisfy Ehrenfest
and Kamerling-Onnes (1914), who set out to provide a deduction of formula
(1) in which the physical premises would be perspicuous. In order to do so,
they represented the possible states of the oscillator system by “symbols”; for
the case in which oscillator 1 possesses the energy 4ε, oscillator 2 the energy
2ε, oscillator 3 0ε (no energy) and oscillator 4 the energy ε, this representative
symbol takes the form (Ehrenfest and Kamerling-Onnes 1914, 870-871):
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
The small circles indicate boundaries between the individual oscillators;
the oscillators themselves are ordered from left to right and could be given
individual labels or names. The background of formula (1) now becomes
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clear: the number of possible energy distributions, given fixed values of P
and N , equals the number of different symbols of this kind that can be
written down with those values of P and N . In each such symbol there are
P instances of ε and (N − 1) instances of the sign . As Ehrenfest and
Kamerling-Onnes (1914) write:
first considering the (N−1+P ) elements ε...ε, ... as so many
distinguishable entities, they may be arranged in
(N − 1 + P )! (2)
different manners between the ends. Next note, that each time
(N − 1)!P ! (3)
of the combinations thus obtained give the same symbol for the
distribution (and give the same energy-grade to each resonator),
viz. all those combinations which are formed from each other by
the permutation of the P elements ε or the (N − 1) elements
. The number of the different symbols for the distribution and
that of the distributions themselves required is thus obtained by
dividing (2) by (3). q.e.d.
The essential premise of the derivation is therefore the permutability of
the signs among each other, and similarly for the signs ε. With regard to
the former permutability, there is no problem: the small circles obviously are
purely formal devices introduced in order to demarcate the individual oscilla-
tors from their neighbors; switching two of these signs does not correspond to
any physical change. The permutability of the energy elements ε may seem
more problematic. One might be tempted to think that these signs refer to
energy quanta conceived as individual physical systems, especially in light of
Einstein’s light quantum hypothesis (Einstein 1905). If that interpretation
of the ε signs were adopted, questions would arise about the identity of the
represented quanta: it is not self-evident from the outset that there can be no
differences whatsoever between situations in which individual light particles
have been switched.
Ehrenfest and Kamerling-Onnes (1914) devote an Appendix to this issue,
entitled The contrast between Panck’s hypothesis of the energy-grades and
Einstein’s hypothesis of energy-quanta (this appendix is actually longer than
the main text of their paper). They emphasize and warn:
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The permutation of the elements ε is a purely formal device, just
as the permutation of the elements is. More than once the
analogous, equally formal device used by Planck, viz. distribution
of P energy-elements over N resonators, has by a misunderstand-
ing been given a physical interpretation...
Planck does not deal with really mutually free quanta ε; the res-
olution of the multiples of ε in separate elements ε, which is
essential in his method, and the introduction of these separate
elements have to be taken cum grano salis ; it is simply a formal
device entirely analogous to our permutation of the elements ε or
. The real object which is counted remains the number of all
the different distributions of N resonators over the energy-grades
0, ε, 2ε, ... with a given total energy Pε.
Ehrenfest and Kamerling-Onnes (1914) back up their claim that the en-
ergy elements should not be thought of as physical entities but have a merely
formal significance by pointing out that Einstein (1905) had assumed his light
quanta to be independent of each other, in the statistical sense, which leads to
Wien’s radiation law (indeed, Einstein had introduced the notion that light
could be considered—in certain respects—as consisting of individual corpus-
cles with energy hν in the context of an investigation of the consequences of
Wien’s law). Planck’s law (which is the empirically correct radiation law),
however, requires a probability distribution of energy elements in which the
number of equiprobable cases is given by Eq. (1)—what we now call the
Bose-Einstein distribution. The difference between the two distributions is
illustrated by Ehrenfest and Kamerling-Onnes (1914) with the help of an
example in which three energy elements have to be distributed over two
oscillators: following Einstein’s 1905 line of reasoning this can be done in
23 = 8 ways (each of the three individual light quanta has an independent
choice between two oscillators), whereas formula (1) tells us that there are
only four ways of doing this. The difference is due to the fact that according
to Eq. (1) only situations in which the total oscillator energies are different
count as distinct, whereas according to Einstein’s original line of reasoning
it would also make a difference which energy element is in which oscillator.
Ehrenfest and Kamerling-Onnes (1914) therefore conclude: “Planck’s formal
device (distribution of P energy-elements Pε over N resonators) cannot be
interpreted in the sense of Einstein’s light-quanta.”
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2.2 Particles without identity
The situation changed drastically when Bose (1924) applied the statistics
of Eq. (1) to a “gas” consisting of light quanta (interpreted as physical ob-
jects instead of energy elements) and was thus able to derive Planck’s law;
and when Einstein (1924) generalized this idea by using the same statistics
to calculate the entropy of a mono-atomic ideal quantum gas. This made
the distribution (1) into a distribution of particles, despite Ehrenfest’s and
Kamerling-Onnes’ qualms about the lack of statistical independence between
such particles. An important consequence of using the new particle distri-
bution is, as we have seen, that permutations between particles, even when
they are in different states (as in the permutation from “particle 1 in state
A and particle 2 in state B” to “particle 2 in state A and particle 1 in state
B”), do not give rise to new configurations.
This change of perspective in which Bose-Einstein statistics became the
statistics of quantum particles was consolidated by the development of mod-
ern quantum mechanics, with its symmetrization rules for particles of the
same kind (“identical particles”). Suppose, in analogy with the example
discussed by Ehrenfest and Kamerlingh-Onnes, that we have three identical
quantum particles that each can be in one of two pure quantum states, |A〉
or |B〉. In this case at least two particles must occupy the same state, so the
particles have to be bosons and the state must be symmetric according to
the symmetrization rules. Quantum mechanics assigns a state to this three-
particle system in the tensor product Hilbert space H1 ⊗ H2 ⊗ H3, where
the factor spaces H1,H2,H3 are one-particle Hilbert spaces. The standard
interpretation is that Hi is the state space of particle i, so that the labels of
the three factor spaces also label the particles.
There are now four possible states:
|Ψ〉1 = |A〉1|A〉2|A〉3 (4)








{|A〉1|B〉2|B〉3 + |B〉1|A〉2|B〉3 + |B〉1|B〉2|A〉3} (7)
That there are only these four possibilities is analogous to Ehrenfest’s
and Kamerling-Onnes’ example in which an undifferentiated amount 3ε of
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quantized energy was distributed over two resonators. In that case all energy
could be possessed by resonator A, or all could be possessed by B; or A could
have the energy 2ε and B the energy ε, and vice versa. In the statistical cal-
culations needed to determine thermodynamic quantities these four possible
cases were assigned equal weights.
In the statistical mechanics of many-particle quantum systems the states
(4)–(7) are similarly assigned equal probabilities. However, now we are deal-
ing with descriptions of particles instead of energy quanta, and the form of
the states (4)–(7), together with the usual understanding of the labels as
particle markers, indicates that there are only four possible particle configu-
rations: all three particles can be in state |A〉; all three can be in state |B〉;
two particles, either the pair {2, 3}, the pair {1, 3} or the pair {1, 2}, can be
in state |A〉 and the remaining one in state |B〉, and the similar possibility
with |A〉 and |B〉 interchanged (states (6) and (7)).
The symmetry with respect to particle labels, plus the fact that states
(6) and (7) receive the same statistical weights as (4) and (5), suggests that
particle permutations do not correspond to physical differences. This sug-
gestion motivates what French and Krause have termed the Received View.
As French and Krause (2006) write (p. 143):
from the point of view of the statistics, the particle labels are
otiose. The implication, then, is that the particles can no longer
be considered to be individuals, that they are, in some sense, ‘non-
individuals’. This conclusion expresses what we have called the
‘Received View’: classical particles are individuals but quantum
particles are not. ... As we shall see in the rest of the book, one
can in fact go beyond mere metaphor and underpin the Received
View with an appropriate logico-mathematical framework.
The formal framework here referred to is that of “quasi-set theory” (French
and Krause 2006, Ch. 7). In this variation on standard (ZFU) set theory two
sorts of “atoms” (“Urelemente”) are admitted, via the introduction of pred-
icates m(x) and M(x) signifying that x is an m-atom or an M -atom, respec-
tively. The intended interpretation is that m-atoms will refer to quantum
particles, whereas M -atoms refer to classical objects. Because of the moti-
vating idea that quantum particles do not possess individuality, the domain
of application of the concept of identity (=) in quasi-set theory is restricted,
so that it excludes m-atoms. There is a (defined) notion of extensional iden-
tity in quasi-set theory, but its applicability is limited to (quasi-)sets and
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M -objects, so that x = y is not a well-formed formula if at least one of the
elements x and y is an m-atom. However, a weaker relation of “indistin-
guishability” (“≡”) is introduced, which is general and so can be applied to
m-atoms. A quasi-set all of whose members are indistinguishable m-atoms
will have a “quasi-cardinal” indicating the number of elements of the quasi-
set, but not an ordinal, since the atoms cannot be labeled (labeling would
provide individual names and thus bestow individuality on the m-atoms).
Without going into further details (see for such details (French and Krause
2006; Arenhart and Krause 2014; Arenhart 2017)), we may say that in this
quasi-set theory m-atoms are handled as elements of collections of objects,
that they are denoted by variables and that it is possible to quantify over
them, and that they can be different in the sense of not being elements of
the same set—everything just as in ordinary set theory. Nevertheless, cer-
tain arguments that are valid in ordinary set theory are blocked for m-atoms
because the notion of identity does not apply to them.
For example, two m-atoms may be indistinguishable, x ≡ y, sharing all
properties, without being the same. In ordinary set theory this is impossible:
one of the shared properties would correspond to “being identical to x”, since
x is identical to itself, x = x. But in quasi-set theory the notion of self-
identity is not applicable to m-atoms, so that Leibniz’s principle does not
hold. By the same token, the singleton set a cannot be formed if a is an
m-atom: this set would consist of all atoms that are identical to a, but the
notion of identity is not defined for m-atoms.
This axiomatic quasi-set theory is meant to capture the nature of quan-
tum particles as entities without identity and to provide a formal background
to the Received View. For instance, permutations of m-atoms lead to indis-
tinguishable situations according to quasi-set theory, which mimics “one of
the most basic facts regarding indistinguishable quanta” (Domenech at al.
2010). The theorem in quasi-set theory which formalizes this indistinguisha-
bility of permuted configurations reads (Domenech at al. 2010, p. 3086):
Let x be a finite quasi-set such that x does not contain all elements
indistinguishable from z, where z is an m-atom such that z ∈ x. If
w ≡ z and w /∈ x, then there exists w′ such that (x−z′)∪w′ ≡ x.
Here z′ and w′ stand for quasi-sets with quasi-cardinal 1 whose only elements
are indistinguishable from z and w, respectively. The idea is that if an
element of a quasi-set is replaced by an element that is indistinguishable from
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it, but originally was not in the same quasi-set, the final situation cannot be
distinguished from the original one.
2.3 Quasi-sets of quantum particles
If the labels that are standardly employed in many-particle quantum mechan-
ics turn out to be otiose in the case of particles of the same sort, one expects
that it should be possible to construct a formalism that does without particle
labels from the very start. The task to reconstruct the quantum mechanics
of many-particle systems accordingly was undertaken by Domenech, Holik
and Krause (2008). Their ab initio label-less quantum theory of particles
without identity takes the following form.
Consider a set of eigenvalues of a quantum mechanical quantity (an “ob-
servable”); for the sake of concreteness take the eigenvalues of the Hamilto-
nian H of the system, so that H|ϕi〉 = εi|ϕi〉, with |ϕi〉 the energy eigen-
states. Now introduce the notion of a “quasi-function”; this is a mapping
associating a finite quasi-set with each value εi, so that disjoint quasi-sets
are associated with different ε-values. It is assumed that the sum of the
quasi-cardinals of the quasi-sets occurring in this mapping is finite. If the
quasi-set x is associated with εi, the interpretation is that the energy level εi
has the quasi-cardinal qc(x) as its occupation number. An alternative way of
representing the situation is with symbols like fε1ε1ε1ε1ε2ε2ε4 , meaning that
the level ε1 has occupation number 4 while the levels ε2 and ε4 have the
occupation numbers 2 and 1, respectively. The levels that do not appear
are understood to have occupation number zero. (Note the similarity to the
“symbols” of Ehrenfest and Kamerling-Onnes discussed in section (2.1)).
The use of pure quasi-sets (i.e., quasi-sets solely consisting of m-atoms)
makes the use of particle labels not only superfluous, but indeed impossible—
as noted before, quasi-sets cannot be ordered. As Domenech, Holik and
Krause (2008) remark, “the only reference is to the occupation numbers,
because permutations make no sense here, as it should be.”
As a tentative critical aside, we note that in our view this remark hits the
nail on its head: if labels cannot be defined, permutations as ordinarily de-
fined make no sense. It would seem natural to take this as a signal that there
are no physical grounds to assume the existence of more than one physical
objects that populate the various states; however, this would eliminate the
very purpose of the introduction of quasi-sets of quantum objects occupying
a state. We will say more about this worry in the next section.
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As Domenech, Holik and Krause (2008) show, state descriptions of the
form fε1ε1ε1ε1ε2ε2ε4 , in which quasi-cardinalities of quasi-sets denote the oc-
cupation numbers of eigenstates like |ϕi〉, can be taken as building blocks
(by converting them into vectors constituting a basis) for the construction of
a many-particle Hilbert space. Not surprisingly, the resulting formalism is
identical to the Fock space formalism of quantum field theory, which makes it
clear that the constructed Hilbert space is isomorphic to either the symmet-
ric (bosons) or antisymmetric (fermions) sector of the usual tensor product
many-particle Hilbert space1.
The Received View thus comes in two flavors. First, there is the labeled
tensor product Hilbert space formalism. In this formalism labels are assumed
to refer to particles, but label differences are declared to not represent any
physical differences because of permutation symmetry. Second, there is the
quasi-set formalism in which labeling is ruled out from the outset. Still,
the existence is accepted of particles that are different from each other and
can be permuted (in the quasi-set theoretical sense explained in section 2.2).
These particles lack identity and therefore cannot possess any individuating
physical properties—they must all share the same characteristics, just as in
the labeled formalism. In short, the quasi-set version of the Received View
is equivalent to the labeled version with the added refinement that labeling
is impossible.
3 Criticism of the Received View
The history of the Received View, briefly sketched in the previous sections,
shows how the notion of particles without identity originates in the applica-
tion to particles of statistics devised for cases in which there is an undifferen-
tiated whole. This amalgam of different conceptual frameworks suffers from
internal tensions: an undifferentiated whole does not consist of non-arbitrary
parts, whereas particles as traditionally conceived are non-arbitrary individ-
uals.
In classical physics it is obvious that particles are such individuals: classi-
cal particles are impenetrable localized entities that travel along well-defined
1An alternative method to handle identical particles without any labels was proposed
and applied in quantum information theory by Lo Franco and co-workers (Lo Franco and
Compagno 2016; Sciara, Lo Franco and Compagno 2017; Dieks 2020). This approach also
boils down to the Fock space formalism of quantum field theory.
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spatial paths. They can consequently be distinguished from each other at any
instant of time and can be followed over time (they possess “genidentity”).
This makes it possible to label classical particles in a physically meaningful
way: their labels can be associated with identifying physical properties (at
least position, possibly also other properties like mass, charge etc.).
Philosophical discussions concerning identical quantum particles may sug-
gest that in quantum mechanics the use of the concept “particle” is com-
pletely different. It then perhaps comes as a surprise that paradigm cases
of the use of “particle” in experimental quantum physics are very much like
the examples from classical physics. Individual elementary particles can be
identified by their paths in devices like a bubble chamber; single electrons
can be trapped in a potential well and kept there for a long time; an electron
gun can be set to fire one single electron, and a bit later this same electron
hits a detector; and so on. In such laboratory situations the attribution of
identity to particles is considered a matter of course, even in the case of
identical quantum particles.
This is not surprising. The experimental practice of physics for a large
part consists in handling things, objects. The use of the particle concept
comes naturally in this context: the very purpose of using the notion of
a particle in experimental practice is the possibility of distinguishing and
pinpointing individual entities. But also on the level of physical theory there
is the need to conceptualize the world in terms of entities, things that can
be different from each other. This is recognized even in quasi-set theory:
although the notion of identity has there been removed from the game, quasi-
set theory is still about “atoms” of which there are definite numbers in their
quasi-sets and that can belong to different quasi-sets, so differ from each
other. However, as soon as we are committed to things that exist in definite
numbers and can be distinct, the notion of identity is implicitly there. As
Berto (2017) analyzes (see also (Jantzen 2011; Dorato and Morganti 2013;
Bueno 2014)):
That a sentence of the form a = b is true, ..., means that we need
to count one thing: the thing named a, which happens to be the
thing named b... That we, instead, count two things, means that
that sentence is false. But then its negation, ¬(a = b), is true.
So a and b are different. And if the concept of difference mean-
ingfully applies to a and b, the one of identity does as well. a = b
is meaningful together with its negation: adding or removing a
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negation in front of such a meaningful sentence cannot turn it
into a meaningless one. The concept of identity cannot but apply
to whatever the concept of difference applies to: if—to use Ryle’s
jargon—we have no category mistake in the latter case, we have
no such mistake in the former. When the number of things (in
a system) is given by positive integer n, these things cannot lack
self-identity.
This argument hinges on a conceptual analysis of what it means to be a
countable entity, an object, a thing: it is part and parcel of this notion of an
entity that it can be different from other entities and that it must be identical
to itself. As a semantic point this is true regardless of the epistemic question
of whether we are actually always able to verify differences between any two
entities. But the analysis has a methodological consequence. In empirical
sciences like physics we need some justification, in the final analysis based
on empirical data, for introducing distinctions and concepts. In our case,
we need some empirical motivation for the introduction of the notion of an
entity, a “particle”, in the theoretical treatment of physical situations. If
it were accepted that no demarcation lines between proposed hypothetical
units can exist, that they lack identity so that they cannot be delineated
from each other even in thought—let alone in experiments—there would be
no ground for conceptualizing wholes as being built up from such proposed
constituents.
Again, the analogy of deposit money in a bank account illustrates the
predicament well: there is nothing in the sum of money (the account’s buy-
ing power)—as it is in the account, as opposed to what may happen in
transfers and withdrawals—that suggests the existence of smaller constituent
entities. To discuss bank accounts in terms of quasi-sets of monetary units
lacking identity, with quasi-cardinalities, does not illuminate the nature of
bank accounts—it rather confuses the issue. Indeed, the introduction of
quasi-sets and the possibility of quantifying over the atoms in them, not as
an eliminable façon de parler but as an explanatory device, cannot but entail
the actual existence of entities working together to compose the value of the
account, and this is something we should reject.
It is exactly this problematic introduction of identity-less entities for the
purpose of discussing what can unproblematically be considered as undif-
ferentiated wholes that lies at the heart of the Received View. As we have
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seen in section 2.3, the Received View2 associates different quantum states
(which can be compared with different bank accounts) not only with occu-
pation numbers (comparable to the values of the individual bank accounts),
but also with quasi-sets whose quasi-cardinals equal the occupation numbers.
That is, instead of saying that state |ϕi〉 has occupation number ni, so that
there is an energy ni.εi in the “mode” represented by |ϕi〉, the Received View
holds that there are ni separate, though identity-less particles, in the state
|ϕi〉.
These quantum particles without identity cannot be ordered and labeled
by natural numbers and therefore cannot be counted in the ordinary sense of
the word.3 Thinking in this way about particles is far removed from physical
practice. As already pointed out, the laboratory practice of quantum physics
is replete with talk about particles that are countable in the ordinary sense,
possess identity, and behave more and more like classical particles when the
classical limit of quantum mechanics is approached. The same particle con-
cept is standard in theoretical considerations. Think, for example, of the
well-known arguments concerning how the uncertainty relations make quan-
tum particles different from their classical counterparts. The uncertainties in
position and momentum of a quantum particle obey the uncertainty relation
∆Q.∆P ≥ h̄, so that a very small value of ∆Q implies a large value of ∆P .
Since P = mv, with m the mass and v the speed of the particle, we can never-
theless have a very small uncertainty in v if the particle is macroscopic (with
a very large mass). This is always taken to mean that a single individual
quantum particle to a very high degree of approximation will have a well-
defined trajectory and will become indistinguishable from a classical particle
2In the form elaborated by Domenech, Holik and Krause (2008) and Domenech at al.
(2010).
3Adherents of the Received View retort that counting identical quantum particles need
not involve a mapping to the natural numbers. For example, Krause and Arenhart (2019)
state that there exist alternative counting procedures, like the weighing of a total amount,
that are able to determine numbers of identity-less entities. Quasi-cardinalities can sim-
ilarly be determined by measuring the total amount of energy in mode |ϕi〉. This is
analogous to arguing that the euros in a bank account can be counted, namely by looking
at the value of the account. But clearly, the existence of a total account value cannot be
regarded as support for the actual existence of quasi-sets of euros in an account; nor can
the existence of an occupation number be seen as support for the existence of several quasi-
particles in state |ϕi〉. Quite the opposite: in such cases the non-existence of a counting
procedure in the ordinary sense, i.e. a mapping to the natural numbers, disconfirms the
existence of well-defined building blocks that constitute the whole.
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in the macroscopic limit. It follows that at least in these cases particles in
the quantum regime are conceived of as identifiable and distinct from their
fellow particles of the same sort—and therefore can be assigned an identity.
There thus proves to be a mismatch between the quantum particles allowed
by the Received View, which never possess identity, and the objects called
particles in the actual practice of quantum physics.
4 Identical Particles as Distinguishable Ob-
jects
The discrepancy between the particle notion used in physical practice and
that of the Received View can be illustrated again by the following warning
issued by Domenech, Holik and Krause (2008, p. 974) in their explanation of
the Received View:
before to continue we would like to make some few remarks on a
common misunderstanding... People generally think that spatio-
temporal location is a sufficient condition for individuality. Thus,
two electrons in different locations are discernible, hence distinct
individuals... we recall that even in quantum physics, fermions
obey the Pauli Exclusion Principle, which says that two fermions
(yes, they ‘count’ as more than one) cannot have all their quan-
tum numbers (or ‘properties’) in common. Two electrons (which
are fermions), one in the South Pole and another one in the North
Pole, are not individuals in the standard sense (and we can do
that without discussing the concepts of space and time). Here,
by an individual we understand an object that obeys the classical
theory of identity of classical (first or higher order) logic (exten-
sional set theory included). In fact, we can say that the electron
in the South Pole is described by the wave function ψS(x), while
the another one is described by ψN(x) (words like ‘another’ in
the preceding phrase are just ways of speech, done in the infor-
mal metalanguage). But the wave function of the joint system
is given by ψSN(x1, x2) = ψS(x1)ψN(x2) − ψN(x1)ψS(x2) (the
function must be anti-symmetric in the case of fermions, that
is, ψNS(x1, x2) = −ψNS(x2, x1)), a superposition of the product
wave functions ψS(x1)ψN(x2) and ψS(x2)ψN(x1). Such a super-
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position cannot be factorized. Furthermore, in the quantum for-
malism, the important thing is the square of the wave function,
which gives the joint probability density; in the present case, we
have ||ψSN(x1, x2)||2 = ||ψS(x1)ψN(x2)||2 + ||ψS(x2)ψN(x1)||2 −
2Re(ψS(x1)ψN(x2)ψS(x2)
∗ψN(x1)
∗). This last ‘interference term’
(though vanishing at large distances), cannot be dispensed with,
and says that nothing, not even in mente Dei, can tell us which is
the particular electron in the South Pole (and the same happens
for the North Pole). As far as quantum physics is concerned, they
really and truly have no identity in the standard sense (and hence
they have not identity at all).
What is attacked in this quotation, and branded “a common misunder-





represents one electron located at the South Pole and one at the North Pole.
This latter interpretation is certainly common, and it is also true that it
conflicts with the Received View; but it should not be dismissed as a mis-
understanding. Rather, it can be shown to be part of a coherent and simple
interpretation of (anti-)symmetric many-particle states that has the great ad-
vantage of not requiring the dubious introduction of entities lacking identity,
and that is in accordance with physical practice.
That it is consistent to interpret (anti-)symmetrized product states like
the one in Eq. 8 as describing individual particles with their own identifying
properties was first pointed out by Ghirardi, Marinatto and Weber (2002).
Details of an encompassing interpretation, rival to the Received View, in
which this result is incorporated were discussed in (Dieks and Lubberdink
2011; Dieks 2020; Dieks and Lubberdink 2020), to which we refer. In the
following we will summarize a number of key points.
The objection put forward in the above quotation hinges on the fact
that states of identical particles must be symmetric or anti-symmetric under
permutations of the labels that occur in the state. As a consequence of
this permutation symmetry the labels do not correspond uniquely to pure
one-particle states: in the example of Eq. (8) neither the label “1” nor the
4We have inserted a factor 1√
2
for the purpose of normalization.
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label “2” belongs uniquely to the state ψS or the state ψN—each of the two
labels attaches equally to ψS and ψN . This motivates the statement, in the
quotation, “that nothing, not even in mente Dei, can tell us which is the
particular electron in the South Pole (and the same happens for the North
Pole).” The thought is that it is impossible to say whether particle 1 or
particle 2 finds itself at any particular Pole.
The silent premise of this argument is that the labels 1 and 2 are particle
labels : they refer to particle 1 and particle 2, respectively, and are therefore
not just mathematical quantities labeling the factor Hilbert spaces in the
total tensor product Hilbert space. The fact that neither of these labeled
particles can be said to be in a state uniquely located at either the North or
the South Pole is interpreted in terms of some kind of indeterminacy: it is
objectively undetermined which particular electron is where.
More generally, the (anti-)symmetry of states of particles of the same
kind has the consequence that the particle labels are “evenly distributed”
over all one-particle states occurring in the total state. The Received View
considers this as proof that not even God could tell which particle is in which
one-particle state.
The basic interpretative maneuver that dismantles this line of thought,
and which we will defend here, is to associate particles not with labels of
factor spaces, but instead with the one-particle states that occur in the total
N -particle state.5 In the example of Eq. (8) this means that we will consider
the indices 1 and 2 as having only a mathematical significance, as labels of
the two factor Hilbert spaces. By contrast, we will define and identify the
particles by the two orthogonal states ψS and ψN that build up the total
state. This interpretative step will immediately eliminate the question of
“which particle is in which state”. The particle defined by ψS is at the South
Pole, the particle defined by ψN at the North Pole, and both statements are
true by definition.
In the case of fermions of the same kind (for example electrons) we have
to work with anti-symmetric states. The one-particle states that occur in
anti-symmetrized product states are all mutually orthogonal and appear only
once in the total state—this is an expression of Pauli’s exclusion principle.
The particles that are defined by these orthogonal states, according to our
5The doctrine that the indices of the factor Hilbert spaces are also particle labels was
dubbed “factorism” by Caulton (2014). The position that we will defend here is therefore
“anti-factorist”.
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interpretation, are completely distinguishable at any instant of time (they are
“absolutely discernible”, i.e. distinguishable by means of monadic physical
properties (Dieks and Versteegh 2008)), since orthogonal quantum states can
always be distinguished perfectly. This, then, bestows identity on fermions:
distinguishability implies identity. There may also be identity over time,
genidentity. For example, this is the case if there is no interaction between N
fermions, so that each one-particle state evolves independently and unitarily.
Orthogonal states remain orthogonal under unitary evolution, so that in this
special case an N -fermion system corresponds to N orthogonal one-particle
states that trace out distinguishable paths in the total Hilbert space.
Another situation in which there is at least approximate genidentity is
that of the classical limit. In this limiting case quantum particles as de-
fined here, by one-particle states, will gradually transform into their classical
counterparts.
However, in the most general quantum regime the existence of unre-
stricted genidentity cannot be guaranteed. Wave packets of particles defined
at one instant of time will generally soon overlap with each other and be
transformed by interactions, after which it may become undetermined which
of the original particles is the same one as any given post-collision particle
(see sections 5 and 6).
It may also happen that the total state is not an (anti-)symmetrized
product, but rather a coherent superposition of product states. In such cases
a simple interpretation in terms of the usual quantum particles (like electrons,
protons, etc.) may prove to be not possible at all. This signals a basic
feature of quantum mechanics in the interpretation that we are discussing:
the concept of a particle is not basic and has no claim to general applicability
in the quantum realm, but rather is emergent (Dieks and Lubberdink 2011;
Dieks 2020; Dieks and Lubberdink 2020). Only if certain conditions are
fulfilled (e.g. relating to the classical limit) do particles emerge.
That the ordinary concept of a quantum particle is not always applicable
in the quantum regime can easily be illustrated for the case of bosons. The
one-particle states occurring in symmetric product states need not be singly
occupied. We encountered this situation in the context of Planck’s energy
packets: any given oscillator could contain more than one energy unit. In-
stead of saying that there are n indistinguishable and identity-less bosons
in a state with occupation number n, in this case our interpretation con-
ceives of the number n as a mass noun. This parallels the example of a total
quantity of n liters of a liquid, in which there is no subdivision into separate
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liter-entities. The statement “there are n bosons in exactly the same state”
should accordingly be replaced by the statement that there is one object,
represented by an n-fold excited “field mode”, without the connotation of
n well-defined parts. This corresponds to the standard interpretation of the
Fock space formalism of quantum field theory.
Summing up, in the alternative to the Received View sketched here, phys-
ical entities are individuated by distinct physical properties, corresponding
to mutually orthogonal quantum states; the factor Hilbert space indices that
occur in the labeled tensor product formalism of the quantum mechanics of
identical particles are not interpreted as particle labels. Quantum objects
defined this way, via orthogonal states, always possess identity, since they are
distinguishable. The notion of a quantum particle introduced this way does
not have unrestricted validity, though: quantum particles are emergent. The
latter point signals another difference with the Received View: according
to the Received View there always are particles, albeit of a very mysterious
kind, always lacking identity. Our alternative says that particles emerge in
certain physical circumstances, and in these cases always possess identity.
5 The Physics and Philosophy of Identical
Particles With Identity
In 1956, in a Letter to the Editor of the Physical Review, the later Nobel prize
winner Hans Dehmelt announced an experimental physics research program
focusing on individual atoms and ions. Dehmelt (1956) predicted that for
individual charged particles “the intriguing possibility even exists to trap
them by suitable fields”. As Dehmelt recalled in a 1990 review of his own
work (Dehmelt 1990), it took another 17 years before he finally succeeded
in confining a single electron quasipermanently in an electromagnetic trap
(Wineland, Ekstrom and Dehmelt 1973). A decade later Van Dyck, Schwin-
berg and Dehmelt (1986) achieved a similar feat with a single positron, which
was kept in a trap and observed continuously during three months—Dehmelt
baptized this specific elementary particle “Priscilla”. In 1989 Dehmelt, to-
gether with Wolfgang Paul, was awarded the Nobel prize in physics “for the
development of the ion trap technique.”
In 2012 the Nobel Prize for physics went to Serge Haroche and David
Wineland “for ground-breaking experimental methods that enable measuring
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and manipulation of individual quantum systems”—methods that elaborated
on the work of Dehmelt. As the 2012 Nobel citation states (Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences 2012): “The Nobel Laureates have opened the door to
a new era of experimentation with quantum physics by demonstrating the
direct observation of individual quantum particles without destroying them.
... David Wineland traps electrically charged atoms, or ions, controlling and
measuring them with light, or photons. Serge Haroche takes the opposite
approach: he controls and measures trapped photons, or particles of light,
by sending atoms through a trap.” Indeed, Haroche and his research group
had been able to study the behavior of a single photon that had been trapped
in a cavity (Gleyzes et al. 2007).
In their report the Nobel committee emphasized that these achievements
should not be seen as engineering feats with little relevance for fundamental or
philosophical questions. As they wrote (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences
2012, “Scientifc Background on the Nobel Prize in Physics”):
These techniques have led to pioneering studies that test the basis
of quantum mechanics and the transition between the microscopic
and macroscopic worlds, not only in thought experiments but in
reality. ... Wineland and coworkers ... created [Schrödinger] “cat
states” consisting of single trapped ions entangled with coher-
ent states of motion and observed their decoherence. Recently,
Haroche and coworkers created cat states, measured them and
made a movie of how they evolve from a superposition of states to
a classical mixture. ... Today, the most advanced quantum com-
puter technology is based on trapped ions, and has been demon-
strated with up to 14 qubits and a series of gates and protocols.
The remarks in the report about the transition from the quantum to the
classical world are particularly pertinent to our present theme. The trapped
particles are defined by their individual states (well-localized in space, in the
mentioned experiments) and can be counted in the ordinary sense. In the
quantum computing case typical configurations consist of series of “qubits”,
positioned next to each other. In the classical limit distinguishable quantum
particles of this sort mimic the behavior of classical particles and thus realize
the transition to the world of classical mechanics. This is all in accordance
with the way in which our alternative to the Received View defines particles.
By contrast, the particles of the Received View itself do not possess any
individuating characteristics, do not have their own states, play no role in
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the classical limit and cannot be the subject of investigations as described
above.
There are countless other examples in the physics literature in which
identical quantum particles are treated as individual entities. In fact, that
identical particles can be dealt with as approximately localized objects that
follow trajectories when the spatial sizes of their wave packets are small
compared to their mutual distances, has been part and parcel of the practice
of quantum mechanics from its beginning.6 Proponents of the view that
quantum particles of the same kind can never possess identity, as a point of
principle, certainly have a reason to attack the fundamental relevance of this
practice. In this spirit Toraldo di Francia wrote (Toraldo di Francia 1985, p.
209), (Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 1993, p. 266):
...an engineer, discussing a drawing, can temporarily make an ex-
ception to the anonymity principle and say for instance: ‘Electron
a issued from point S will hit the screen at P while electron b
issued from T hits it at Q’. But this mock individuality of the
particles has very brief duration.
Toraldo di Francia (1985) did not explain the use of the somewhat dis-
paraging term mock individuality, but only made the brief remark that this
“individuality” breaks down as soon as the electron encounters other elec-
trons, for example by entering an atom. However, even if we set aside for the
moment questions about what exactly happens in such processes, it remains
obscure why an individuality that does not last forever, perhaps even lasts
only very briefly, should be dismissed as a “mock individuality”. After all,
everyday macroscopic objects also usually have finite life spans but it would
seem weird to deny, on that ground, their identity when they are still intact.
Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia (1993) attempted to fill this lacuna
in the argumentation and provided a more extensive explanation for the use
of the term “mock identity”. They start by admitting that particles could be
defined, conventionally as they say, through their different states and thus
even be given proper names (curiously, there is no reference to Dehmelt’s
Priscilla). They also note that the thus defined objects could last for a very
long time. Still, they maintain, their possibly limited life span raises a serious
worry concerning the identity of such objects and the value of the names that
are given. They write (Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia 1993, p. 267):
6Note that also here silent use is made of a characterization of particles via one-particle
states, instead of by “particle labels”.
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Prima facie one may be tempted to think that the case of particle
a is not different from that of Aristotle. After all, there was
no Aristotle before 384 b.C. or after 322 b.C. But, in general,
the particle does not die! An electron may very well survive a
close encounter with another electron. Suppose that we follow
with continuity an electron—say Peter—going from point P to
point Q in a vacuum. We would like to be able to say that in a
possible world Peter might encounter other electrons on its path
and finally be scattered to Q. But then no one could tell that that
electron is still Peter. There is no trans-world identity. In this
situation the meaning of ‘rigid designator’ becomes very fuzzy.
Anyway, the term seems useless.
In order to judge this argument we need not enter into a discussion of
possible worlds containing collisions that do not actually occur, the concept
of trans-world identity over such other worlds, and the Kripkean notion of
a “rigid designator”. The physically relevant core of the above reasoning is
that in a process in which electron Peter collides with another individual
electron (Paul, say), after which there still are two individual electrons, it
may be impossible to tell which of these post-collision electrons is Peter and
which is Paul. This is deemed unacceptable, since Peter has not died.
It is true that a loss of distinguishability of the described kind might
occur—we will discuss this in the next section. But the argument as stated
is unconvincing nonetheless. If the identity of Peter and Paul were completely
lost in their encounter7, this would surely mean that both Peter and Paul have
died as individual particles due to the collision, contrary to the premise in
the above argument that particles in general do not die. It is as if Aristotle
and his completely identical twin brother meet and coalesce, in a science
fiction scenario, after which two perfectly equal look-alikes reappear and
start following their own courses. It is certainly possible to devise scenarios
of this kind in which it makes no sense to ask who of the later two persons is
the original Aristotle. But it does not follow at all from this that it is futile
to use the name “Aristotle” for the philosopher when he is still Aristotle,
and that we should deny him his identity. The usefulness of giving names,
and assigning identity, in analogous physics situations was exactly what was
argued for in our above discussion of work leading to the 1989 and 2012
physics Nobel prizes.
7It is not absolutely necessary that such a loss occurs in an encounter, see section 6.
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Décio Krause, one of the co-authors of the term “Received View” (French
and Krause 2006) and one of the staunchest defenders of the position, has
undertaken to investigate and criticize the claims of Dehmelt, Haroche and
Wineland (Krause 2011, 2019). Krause concludes that contrary to those
claims, identical quantum particles always lack identity—even when they are
trapped, are distinguishable and bear unambiguous names (like Priscilla).
His argument relies on the fundamental quantum postulate that identical
particles must be in permutation invariant states. Krause takes this postulate
to imply that it does not make any difference to a physical situation when a
particle, even a particle in a trap, is replaced by an arbitrary other particle
of the same kind. This means, the argument continues, that in Dehmelt’s
experiment there is no fact of the matter concerning the question which
positron in the universe is Priscilla. No positron has an identity, and Priscilla
is only a “mock name”.
Krause devotes a similar analysis to a situation with two trapped elec-
trons, one in the infinite potential well (trap) 1 and the other at some distance
in a similar potential well 2. The two particle wave function for this case is








where ψ1 and ψ2 are wave functions that vanish everywhere except in well
1 and well 2, respectively; a and b are the labels of the two factor Hilbert
spaces in the tensor product Hilbert space of the two-particle system. Krause
comments:
note that we are dealing with different Hilbert spaces, the space of
a and the space of b. But, if the particles are indistinguishable,
how can we know which particle is in well 1? In other terms,
which particle has its states represented by vectors of the first
space? There is no way to do it, for anyone of them could be in
well 1.
The conclusion must therefore be the same as in the case of Priscilla:
Although trapped in the infinite wells, they [i.e., the quantum
particles ] have only what Toraldo di Francia has termed mock in-
dividuality, an individuality (and, we could say, a ‘mock identity’)
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that is lost as soon as the wells are open or when another simi-
lar particle is added to the well (if this was possible). And this
of course cannot be associated with the idea of identity. Truly,
there is no identity card for quantum particles. They are not
individuals, yet can be isolated by trapping them for some time.
Krause’s argument consists in a consistent application of the Received
View to the case of trapped particles, but it is not really a defense of the
Received View against rival interpretations. The argument accepts from the
outset a key point of the Received View, namely that the labels occurring
in the total state refer to particles, and does not address possible alterna-
tives. But this interpretation of the labels is precisely the main point on
which the alternative view that we have been discussing, and which is im-
plicit in much of the physics cited above, deviates from the Received View.
Since the Received View interprets the labels as referring to particles, it sees
the invariance under label permutations as proof that the particles do not
possess individual characteristics. But this conclusion does not follow in
our “anti-factorist” scheme: particles are here characterized by one-particle
states occurring in the total state, instead of by labels. This different charac-
terization immediately shows that in the alternative interpretation particles
will be distinguishable individuals.
What Krause’s argument shows is that application of the Received View
philosophy to the findings of Dehmelt, Haroche and Wineland leads to the
conclusion that all particles in the experiments performed by these Nobel
physicists lacked identity. But since it is the very premise of the Received
View that all identical quantum particles always and under all circumstances
are indistinguishable and without identity, this conclusion teaches us nothing
new. In fact, instead of being a defense of the Received View, Krause’s
reasoning neatly illustrates some of its awkward and implausible features.
His argument hinges on the thought that we can never know which positron
in the universe is Priscilla (and similarly which electron is in trap 1 or 2).
This statement suggests ignorance about what is the case—but that cannot
be intended, since it would imply that it makes sense to say that, unknown
to us, this or that positron is in fact Priscilla. That would presuppose the
individuality of the positron in question—whereas individuality is something
no positron possesses, according to the Received View. Rather, the formal
elaboration in terms of quasi-sets suggests that we should conceive of the
lack of “which particle” knowledge as a kind of ontological indeterminacy.
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But in that case it makes no sense to wonder “which positron” could be in
Priscilla’s trap: there is no definite “this or that” positron. The conceptual
picture is therefore obscure and verges on the brink of inconsistency. This
should be contrasted with the simple and natural picture offered by the rival
interpretation: Priscilla is by definition the positron in Dehmelt’s trap, and
it is the positron so baptized by Dehmelt; electron 1 is the electron defined
by ψ1, therefore by definition in trap 1, and vice versa for electron 2.
8
6 Loss of Distinguishability and Identity
In 1987 Hong, Ou and Mandel performed a famous experiment that started
a tradition of research in which individual photons, or atomic particles of
the same kind, traveling along distinguishable paths, are brought together so
that their wave functions overlap—this leads to a loss of distinguishability
manifested by interference phenomena (Hong, Ou and Mandel 1987; Ou and
Mandel 1988; Lopes et al. 2015). A recent version of the scheme, applied to
two electrons, goes as follows (Tichy et al. 2013).
Suppose that we have two electron guns, one to the Left and one to the
Right, and suppose that each of these devices fires exactly one electron—
one with spin up in the z-direction, the other with spin down. (We follow
the way in which experiments of this kind are commonly described in the
physics literature, in which particles are defined by one-particle states, in
accordance with our rival to the Received View.) Since electrons are identical
fermions, we have to anti-symmetrize the total wave function, so that it has
the following anti-symmetrized product form:
1√
2
{|L〉1|R〉2|↑〉1|↓〉2 − |R〉1|L〉2|↓〉1|↑〉2}. (10)
The two individual electron wave packets evolve independently, by free
evolution; for the sake of simplicity we do not represent this (trivial) part
of the evolution in the formulas. Now, after some time, each wave packet
encounters a beam splitter and is split; this happens in such a way that, of
8It is actually incorrect that these electron identities are automatically and necessarily
lost as soon as the potential wells are opened so that the electrons can escape. For
example, in free evolution ψ1 and ψ2 remain orthogonal states, so that they still define
distinct identities—see section 6.
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both original packets, one half is directed to the location L′ and the other
half to the location R′.
The two beam splitters and the evolution after the transit through the
splitters can be represented by unitary transformations and change the in-
coming states in the following way:
|L〉 → 1√
2
(|L′〉+ |R′〉) , (11)
|R〉 → 1√
2
(|L′〉 − |R′〉) , (12)
where the states (ket vectors) |L′〉 and |R′〉 correspond to wave packets lo-
calized at L′ and R′, respectively.
After the evolution, the total state is still an anti-symmetrized product.
The two original orthogonal spatial states |L〉 and |R〉 have evolved, by the
unitary evolution, into two new orthogonal states (the right-hand sides of
(11) and (12))—let us call these φ and ψ, respectively. The final total state
can so be written as
1√
2
{|φ〉1|ψ〉2|↑〉1|↓〉2 − |ψ〉1|φ〉2|↓〉1|↑〉2}. (13)
According to our interpretation this state still represents two individual
and distinguishable particles, now defined by the orthogonal states |φ〉|↑〉 and
|ψ〉|↓〉, respectively. This individual particle interpretation will be confirmed
if we perform measurements of observables like |φ〉〈φ|, |ψ〉〈ψ|, |↑〉〈↑| or |↓〉〈↓ |;
such measurements are able to distinguish perfectly between the two states
defining our particles.
However, if we perform local (in the spatial sense) spin measurements, by
using electron spin detectors positioned at L′ and R′, an interpretation of the
results in terms of independent individual particles may appear problematic.
This is so because both of the two initial particles contribute to all detection
results at L′ and R′, which leads to interference. A calculation shows (Tichy
et al. 2013; Dieks 2020) that correlations between spin values obtained at
L′ and R′ will be found that suggest the presence of an entangled state
(i.e., not a symmetrized product state) of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type;
this is a “holistic” state that does not represent two independently existing
particles each possessing its own set of distinctive physical properties (Dieks
and Lubberdink 2011; Dieks 2020; Dieks and Lubberdink 2020).
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This example illustrates how overlap of wave functions may veil the in-
dividuality of particles, without destroying it. In the discussed case there
were always two individual particles, also during their encounter. Each kept
its own identity, and this could have been verified by performing appropriate
measurements. But if only the results of local measurements in the overlap
area are available this will lead astray and suggest a loss of individuality.
These comments address part of the worries expressed by Toraldo di Fran-
cia (1985); Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia (1993); Krause (2011, 2019).
They show that identity grounded in individual and orthogonal one-particle
states is not automatically and immediately lost outside of traps and in “close
encounters”, contrary to what was assumed by these authors.
It is true, however, that in general interactions (anti-)symmetric product
states may be converted into superpositions of such states, which are not
products themselves. In such cases the interaction will lead to entanglement;
and as a result there will be a real loss of identity, since it will no longer be
possible to decompose the total state into one-particle states.
In the case of bosons there is the additional possibility that two originally
orthogonal states, both with occupation number 1, will evolve into a new
state with occupation number 2, and similarly for more bosons. This would
also imply a loss of identity: two individual particles would merge into one
object, one whole, which is no longer an elementary particle.
In all such situations the applicability of the concept of an individual
elementary particle will be suspended. The original particle will “die”, and
its identity will die with it. However, as argued in section 5, a finite life span
does not degrade identity into mock identity.
7 Conclusion
According to the Received View the world described by quantum mechan-
ics consists of elementary building blocks that lack identity, share all their
physical properties, and are impossible to identify. This picture is hugely
different from what is suggested by the actual practice of quantum physics
and by the limiting cases in which classical physics becomes applicable. We
have sketched an alternative to the Received View, drawing on earlier work,
and compared and contrasted it with its rival. According to this alternative,
systems of identical quantum particles can in many cases be described as
consisting of individual particles, possessing their own identity. This view
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makes sense of the way such systems are usually discussed in the practice of
physics, and it also provides an understandable and simple story of the way
in which the classical world emerges from the quantum realm.
Differently from the Received View, the alternative does not maintain
that the world on its deepest quantum level is always particle-like. Parti-
cles emerge, under certain conditions. The typical quantum phenomenon
of a Bose-Einstein condensate provides an example. According to the Re-
ceived View such a condensate should be conceptualized as consisting of
many bosons, different from each other but still lacking identity. This is
analogous to thinking of a bank account in terms of different euros, exist-
ing independently of each other but without identity. The alternative view
adopted here is that a bank account has a certain value, a purchasing power,
that is not composed of independent constituents. Similarly, a Bose-Einstein
condensate is one object, having a total mass and charge without indepen-
dent components. But when this object is subjected to certain interactions
or measurements, individual bosons (possessing identity!) may emerge. In
the case of fermions, one-particle states can only be singly occupied, and
this makes it easier for fermions than for bosons to manifest themselves as
individual particles.
We believe that this alternative to the Received View not only fits physical
practice better, but also provides a consistent and understandable perspective
that improves on the obscure notion of identity-less physical objects.
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